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NIXON V. SHRINK MISSOURI GOVERNMENT PAC: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, 
SYMBOLIC SPEECH AND THE APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (Shrink III)1 is the most 
important case involving campaign finance reform since the Supreme Court 
decided Buckley v. Valeo.2  The Court has addressed various campaign 
finance issues3 subsequent to Buckley, but it has not addressed the 
constitutionality of limits on individual campaign contributions to a candidate.4   
                                                 
1119 S. Ct. 901 (1999), certifying questions to Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. 
Adams (Shrink II), 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998). 
2Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  In Buckley, the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of limits on campaign contributions in the context of the Federal Election 
Contributions Act (Act).  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-30.  The Act provided that no 
“person shall make contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for 
Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $ 1,000.”  Id. at 189, quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 608(b)(1) (1970 ed., Supp IV).  A “person” is defined as “an individual, partnership, 
committee, association, corporation, or any other organization or group of persons.”  
Id. at 187, quoting 18 U.S.C. § 591(g) (1970 ed., Supp IV). 
3These issues include: expenditures by corporations and political committees: Federal 
Election Comm’n. v. National Conservative PAC (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480 (1985) 
(invalidating certain expenditure limits by political action committees (hereinafter 
PACs) when a presidential candidate accepts public financing); contribution and 
expenditure limitations involving ballot measures, First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating expenditure restrictions on a corporation that 
intended to influence ballot initiatives); Citizens Against Rent Control / Coalition for 
Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, Cal. (Citizens Against Rent Control), 454 U.S. 290 
(1981) (invalidating contribution limits to committees formed to support or oppose 
ballot initiatives); contributions to multicandidate PACs,  California Medical Ass'n v. 
FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (upholding $5,000 contribution limit to multicandidate 
political committees). 
4Numerous commentators disagree with effectiveness or propriety of limits on 
campaign contributions.  Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance 
Regulations and the First Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1 (1997) (stating that political 
liberties will be sacrificed by another unsuccessful attempt to prevent corruption and 
promote equality in campaign financing); Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of 
Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 213 (1989) (concluding that 
the only way to ensure equality in campaign financing is to increase, or “level-up” 
spending because leveling-down benefits the wealthy at the expense of the working 
classes); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 893 (1998) (stating that opponents of campaign finance reform promote 
equality by recognizing that voters use different decisional criteria when choosing a 
candidate, and increased speech as the result of increased spending is necessary to 
1
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The Buckley Court held that contributions limits are permissible,5 but it 
was ambiguousabout the appropriate standard of review.6  As a result, courts 
employ varying standards and levels of proof to determine if a contribution limit 
is unconstitutionally low.7  The Eighth Circuit is unique because it has reviewed 
more cases challenging contribution limits than any other circuit.8  Some 
commentators believe that the Circuit’s standard of review is so strict that 
campaign finance reform employing limits on campaign contributions is nearly 
impossible in the Eighth Circuit.9  
 
The purpose of this note is two-fold.  First , it reviews pertinent cases 
and sets forth the appropriate standard of review for contribution limits.10  
Second, it delineates the test that enables government to customize 
contribution limits to the characteristics of its voting districts without violating 
the First Amendment.11   Part II provides a brief history of campaign finance 
reform, emphasizing limits on campaign contributions.12  Part III examines the 
history of campaign contribution limits in Missouri and the Eighth Circuit’s 
role.13  Part IV concludes that contribution limits are entitled to a heightened 
                                                                                                                         
facilitate these decisions). 
 
5”Congress was surely entitled to conclude that . . . contribution ceilings were a 
necessary legislative  concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption.” 
 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28. 
6The Court fails to define the appropriate scope of review concerning contribution limits. 
 Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and 
Campaign Finance, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1050 (1985). 
7See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
8For a history of campaign finance reform cases in the Eighth Circuit and a summary 
of contribution caps in the United States, see William J. Connolly, Note, How Low Can 
You Go?  State Campaign Contribution Limits and the First Amendment, 76 B.U.L. 
REV. 483 (1996). 
9See Matthew S. Criscimagna, Note, The Narrow Application of Buckley v. Valeo: Is 
Campaign Finance Reform Possible in the Eighth Circuit?, 64 MO. L. REV. 437 (1999). 
10The appropriate standard of review is a heightened intermediate level of review.  See 
infra notes 65-95 and accompanying text. 
11Nixon v. Shrink Government PAC (Shrink III) addresses the singular issue of 
contribution limits and does not address other reform techniques such as limits on 
non-resident contributions, restrictions on intra-candidate contributions, or defined 
fundraising seasons. __ U.S. __, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999).  See infra note 19 (discussing 
other reform techniques). 
12See infra notes 17-39 and accompanying text. 
13See infra notes 40-64 and accompanying text. 
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intermediate standard of review.14  The court should defer to a reasonable 
legislative determination that the electorate perceives corruption due to large 
campaign contributions15 and address two questions to determine if 
contribution limits are unconstitutionally low: first, whether the limitation impairs 
a candidate’s ability to amass the resources necessary for an effective 
campaign; and second, whether the percentage of contributors affected by the 
limits is within a reasonable range.16 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
The cost of political campaigns began to increase in the early 
nineteenth century.17  In response to the growing reliance on campaign 
contributions, state and federal governments have attempted to regulate 
campaign financing to eliminate the corruptive influences of large campaign 
                                                 
14See infra notes 65-101 and accompanying text. 
15See infra notes 102-121 and accompanying text. 
16See infra notes 122-133 and accompanying text. 
17Smith, supra note 4, at 9-11.  Professor Smith attributes this to a number of factors. 
 Inflation is one factor.  Id. at 12.  One dollar in 1900 is worth twenty dollars today.  Id. 
 In addition, the cost of essential items of campaigning such as paper, postage and 
advertising have increased more than the rate of  inflation.  Id. at 13. A second factor 
is the growth in the size of the electorate.  Id. at 13-14.  This is attributable to a 
number of events: 
States gradually dropped religious and property qualifications for 
voting.  The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution eliminated 
formal bans on voting based explicitly on race.  The Nineteenth 
Amendment enfranchised women and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment 
gave eighteen year-olds the right to vote.  Statutory changes have 
also expanded the franchise.  Especially notable is the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, a stunning success in eliminating legal barriers to black 
voter registration in the South.  The Supreme Court also expanded 
the electorate, through a series of decisions striking down 
‘grandfather clauses,’ whites-only primary elections, bans on voting 
by citizens in the military, poll taxes and unduly long residency 
requirements.   
Id. (citations omitted).  A third reason for the increase in the cost of elections is the 
“gradual democratization of campaign methods.”  Id. at 15.  Political campaigns 
shifted away from communicating through partisan newspapers and circulars to a style 
of campaigning that brought the candidate in contact with the electorate.  Id.  Also 
important are the cost of complying with campaign regulations and the increase in 
available funds for campaigns.  Id. at 16-17  Finally, the growth of government is the 
most important factor of all.  Id. at 18.  As Government has more power to “bestow 
benefits on the populace, or to regulate human endeavors,” groups and individuals have 
more incentive to influence those who wield this power.  Id. at 17. 
3
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donations and to equalize the voices of the electorate.18  Since the early 
1800s, the government has taken various approaches to “reform”,19 but the 
most popular,20 and the most controversial, are limitations on the amount one 
can spend on a campaign and the amount of money one can contribute to a 
candidate or political committee. 
 
A.  Buckley v. Valeo21 
 
In 1974, Congress amended the Federal Election Campaigns Act of 
1971 (FECA), in part, by limiting political contributions 22 and expenditures23 by 
                                                 
18The first campaign finance laws addressed the corruptive influence of corporate 
contributions.  Id. at 20-21.  Between 1907 and the present, Congress has amended 
federal election laws eleven times.  Id. at 20-24.  The Watergate scandals of 1972-74 
prompted Congress to pass the 1974 Federal Election Campaigns Act (FECA) 
Amendments, which were the subject of Buckley v. Valeo.  Id. at 24-25.  In Buckley, 
the Court held that the goal of equalizing the electorate’s voice is an illegitimate state 
interest in the context of campaign expenditure limits.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 
(emphasis added).  “[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some 
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign 
to the First Amendment . . . .”  Id.   
19Other approaches to reform include: disclosure requirements, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
60-85; public financing schemes, Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637 
(6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied. 522 U.S. 860 (1997); limitations on non-resident 
contributions, Vanatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 
S.Ct. 870 (1999); Whitmore v. FEC, 68 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 
U.S. 1155 (1996); defined fundraising seasons, Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1112 (1999); North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 
168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed (May 18, 1999); Emison v. 
Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); restrictions on intra-candidate 
transfers, Service Employees Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Fair Political Practice 
Comm’n, 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 505 U.S. 1230 (1992); Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 
(1996); Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1996), aff’d and 
remanded,149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 890 (1999). 
20Contribution limits are popular because it is one of the few accessible tools available 
in the current political climate.  See infra note 37. 
21424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
22The relevant provisions addressing contribution limits were: 18 USCS § 608(b)(1) 
(limiting to $1,000 political contributions by an individual, organization or group to any 
single candidate); 18 USCS § 608(b)(2) (limiting contributions by a political committee 
to any single candidate to $5,000); 18 USCS § 608(b)(3) (limiting total annual 
contributions by any contributor to $25,000); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 & nn.12-15. 
23The relevant provisions addressing expenditure limitations were 18 USCS § 608(e)(1) 
4
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individuals, political committees and candidates in federal elections.  Soon 
thereafter the Court questioned whether contribution and expenditure 
limitations violated the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech or 
association,24 by drawing a parallel between spending money and political 
speech:  
 
[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group can 
spend on political communication during a campaign 
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting 
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their expression, 
and the size of the audience reached.  This is because virtually 
every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society 
requires the expenditure of money.25 
 
The Court then distinguished independent expenditures26 and campaign 
contributions by focusing on the quantity of political speech affected by the 
limitations.27  Under a “rigorous ”28 standard of review, the Court held that limits 
                                                                                                                         
(limiting to $1,000  total annual expenditures advocating election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate); 18 USCS § 608(a)(1) (limiting expenditures by a candidate for a 
calendar year); 18 USCS § 608(c) (limiting overall expenditures by a candidate).  Id. 
24Contribution limits implicate freedom of association because there is value in 
“persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a common end.”  
Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294.  “[B]y collective effort individuals can 
make their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or lost.”  Id.  
“[T]he freedom of association is diluted if it does not include the right to pool money 
through contributions, for funds are often essential if ‘advocacy’ is to be truly or 
optimally ‘effective’.”  Id. at 296, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65-66. 
25Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. Professor Balkin argues that “money as speech” is an 
example of the ideological shift occurring with free speech.  J. M. Balkin, Some 
Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 375 (1990).  “Freedom of speech has typically ensured that one could affect 
change in society by the expression of a viewpoint even though the viewpoint is 
unpopular.”  Id. at 383.  In contrast today, business interests and conservative groups 
are using freedom of speech as a way to preserve the status quo.  Id. at 384.  “What 
was sauce for the liberal goose increasingly has become sauce for the more 
conservative gander.”  Id.  
26An expenditure is independent if it is done without “prearrangement and coordination” 
with the candidate.  Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 
U.S. 604, 615 (1996). 
27Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18-19. Justice White disagreed with this position.  Id. at 259 
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  He stated that the Act does not 
restrict speech, but only regulated “giving and spending money.”  Id.  This has First 
Amendment significance because “money may be used to defray the expenses of 
speaking or otherwise communicating about the merits or demerits of federal 
5
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on independent expenditures are unconstitutional because they impose 
“substantial rather than merely theoretical”29 restraints on speech, and 
therefore, directly infringe political speech and political association.30  
Conversely, the Court established the constitutionality of contribution limits, 
finding that campaign contributions are symbolic speech31 and that 
contributors have other ways to exercise their First Amendment freedoms.32  
Finally, the government’s interest in preventing corruption and33 the 
appearance of corruption34 is a “sufficiently important interest”35 to allow 
restrictions, and contribution limits are a narrowly tailored method to serve this 
interest.36  
                                                                                                                         
candidates for election.” Id.  Justice White believed that both contribution and 
expenditure limits are constitutional.  Id. at 261-66.  The distinction between 
contributions and expenditures has also drawn ire from Justice Thomas.  See 
Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 635-37.  However, in contrast to Justice White, 
Justice Thomas believes that limits on contributions and expenditures are an 
unconstitutional infringement on First Amendment rights.  Id. 
28Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29. 
29Id. at 19. 
30Id.  In contrast, Professor Neuborne notes that the money equals speech relationship 
may hold true at lower levels of spending, but it does not hold true at extremely high 
expenditure levels.  Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free Speech: Love and a 
Question, 42 ST.  LOUIS U. L.J. 789, 796 (1998).  At this level, “speech is merely 
repetitive” and is “better viewed as exercises of power, not speech.”  Id. 
31The speech is symbolic because it is a general expression of support for a candidate 
and the expression does not change significantly with the size of the contribution.  
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.  But see infra note 72. 
32Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-22.  A contributor could exercise First Amendment speech 
rights by discussing candidates and issues.  Id. at 21.  Further, a contributor is free to 
become a member of a political association or “assist personally in the association’s 
efforts on behalf of candidates.”  Id. at 22.  See also infra note 73. 
33Arguably, the issue in Shrink III could turn on whether the legitimate harm is 
“corruption and the appearance of corruption,” or “corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.”  See infra notes 114-15.  This note assumes that preventing the 
appearance of corruption is a legitimate state interest without proof of actual 
corruption. 
34Preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption were the only governmental 
interests the Court approved of in Buckley.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. 
35Id. at 25. 
36Id. at 28-29.  This is because contribution limitations focus  
precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions --the narrow 
aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for 
corruption have been identified -- while leaving persons free to engage 
in independent political expression, to associate actively through 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol33/iss4/3
2000]                     NIXON V. SHRINK MISSOURI GOVERNMENT PAC 
 
 
B.  Governmental and Judicial Response to Buckley. 
 
States and municipalities imposed a wide range of restrictions on 
contributions and expenditures in response to Buckley, and the courts 
responded in equally diverse ways when the restrictions were challenged.37  
                                                                                                                         
their volunteering services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless 
substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with 
financial resources. 
Id. at 28.   
37Contribution limits that approach the absolute dollar limit in Buckley are usually 
upheld.  Kentucky Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 648 (upholding $1,000 per election year); 
Florida Right to Life, Inc. v. Mortham, No. 98-770-CIV-ORL-19A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16694, at *24-25 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 1998) (upholding $500 per election); Driver v. 
Distefano, 914 F. Supp. 797 (D.R.I. 1996) (upholding $1,000 per calendar year).   
However, courts strike down a wide range of limits.  See California Prolife 
Council PAC v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1998) aff’d 164 F.3d 1189 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (striking down limits of $500 per election if candidate does not agree to 
expenditure caps); Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (striking 
down limits of $100 for privately-financed candidates per election); National Black 
Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 924 F. Supp. 270, 
275-81 (D.D.C. 1996), vacated as moot 108 F.3d 346 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (mooted by 
passage of legislation increasing contribution limits) (striking down per election cycle 
limits for city officials of: $50 for ward office or political party posts, $100 for District-
wide office), Vannatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d 770 (OR. 1997) (striking down limits of 
$500 to candidate of statewide office and $100 to candidate running for state senator 
or representative). 
The Eighth Circuit has struck down every limit it has reviewed.  Shrink 
Missouri Government PAC v. Adams (Shrink II), 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. 
granted, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999) (striking 
down limits tied to race and population in district: $275 for state representative or 
population under 100,000, $525 for state senator or population over 100,000, $1,075 for 
governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, state auditor, 
attorney general or population over 250,000); Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 510 (1998), and cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1040 (1999) 
(striking down limits of $300 for office of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of 
state, treasurer, auditor, attorney general, and commissioner of state lands; $100 for 
all other state public offices); Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 
518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (striking down per election cycle limits tied to number of 
residents in district: $100 if under 100,000, $200 if over 100,000 and other than 
statewide election, $300 if statewide election); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995) (striking down $100 limit to political 
committee or political fund).  See also, Arkansas Right to Life State PAC v. Butler, 29 
F. Supp. 2d 540 (W.D. Ark. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 1041 (1999) (striking down 
7
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Although courts employ Buckley’s “rigorous” standard of review, they interpret 
“rigorous” to require extremes ranging from complete deference to 
governmental findings,38 to requiring actual proof of corruption.39 
 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
A.  History of Limitations on Campaign Contributions in Missouri. 
 
In the spring of 1994, the Missouri General Assembly passed Senate 
Bill 650 which limited campaign contributions to $250, $500, or $1,000, per 
election.40  In November, 1994, the Missouri electorate approved Proposition A, 
which supplanted Senate Bill 650 by lowering contribution limits to $100, $200, 
or $300, and applied the limits to each election cycle.41  The Eighth Circuit 
invalidated Proposition A in Carver v. Nixon42 because the State did not submit 
                                                                                                                         
limits of $500 to independent expenditure committees). 
38For example, in Kentucky Right to Life, the Sixth Circuit did not require proof of 
corruption or the appearance of corruption, it merely restated the legislative purpose of 
the act: “to combat actual and perceived corruption in Kentucky politics.”  Kentucky 
Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 640.  The court then considered the next step of the 
analysis: whether the limits are narrowly drawn to meet these legitimate interests.  Id. 
at 648. 
39The Eighth Circuit falls in the latter category and interprets “rigorous” to mean strict 
scrutiny.  See infra note 59.  See also Vannatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d at 785-86 
(employing strict scrutiny and requiring proof of harm). 
40Carver, 72 F.3d at 635.  The exact limit depended on the type of race or the 
population in the district for which the candidate was running: $250 for state 
representative or population under 100,000; $500 for state senator or population over 
100,000; $1,000 for governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, 
state auditor, attorney general or population over 250,000.  Id. at 635.  The limit 
applied to primary and general elections separately.  Shrink Missouri Government 
PAC v. Adams (Shrink I), 5 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mo. 1988), rev’d Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, Nixon v. 
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999), citing Mo.Ann. Stat. § 
130.011 (West Supp. 1998).  Thus, the contributor could contribute double the 
limitation per election cycle by making a contribution in both the primary and general 
elections.  Carver, 72 F.3d at 635.  The limits were to become effective January 1, 
1995.  Id. at 634.   
41Carver, 72 F.3d at 634 n.1.  Proposition A permitted per candidate contributions of 
$100 in districts with fewer than 100,000 residents; $200 in districts of 100,000 or 
more residents, other than statewide office; and $300 for statewide candidates.  Id.  
These limits were very low, because an election cycle includes both the primary and 
general elections and a per election limit is essentially half of the stated limits.  Id. at 
635 n.3. 
4272 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995). 
8
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evidence to justify why the specific limits were selected, nor why the limits were 
narrowly tailored to combat the corruption or appearance of corruption 
associated with large contributions.43  The Carver court enjoined the 
implementation of Proposition A,44 and the limits in Senate Bill 650 replaced 
Proposition A’s limits.45  
 
 
B.  Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Adams (Shrink I):46  
 
The contribution limits under challenge in Shrink I were $275, $525 or 
$1075, per election. 47  The district court upheld the limits using an analysis 
similar to the one that the Eighth Circuit employed in Carver v. Nixon.48  First, 
the court determined that the State provided sufficient evidence of the 
appearance of corruption as the result of large campaign contributions.49  Next, 
the court analyzed whether the limits were unconstitutionally low.  It noted that 
Senate Bill 650’s limits were not different in kind50 from the limits approved in 
Buckley,51 even though they were worth only $378, $184.80, and $96.70 after 
                                                 
43Id. at 641-43.   
44Id. at 645.  See also infra note 41. 
45Shrink I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 737. 
465 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mo. 1988). 
47Mo. Ann. Stat. § 130.032 (West Supp. 1998).  These reflect Senate Bill 650’s 
requirement that the state make biannual adjustments for the effects of inflation.  Mo. 
Ann. Stat. § 130.032.2.  
48Shrink I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 742.   
49Id. at 737-39.  “The Court does not believe that polling the citizenry is required . . . , 
members of the legislature are uniquely qualified to gauge whether allowing [large] 
contributions to go unchecked endangers our democratic system of government, and, 
if so, to prescribe an appropriate remedy therefore.”  Id. at 738.  ”Even for one 
unschooled in politics, no great deductive leap is required to reach a conclusion that 
the contribution of substantial sums to a candidate for political office gives rise to a 
perception among the public that the contributor is trying to curry favor with the 
recipient.”  Id. at 739.  The circumstances surrounding the enactment of the limits and 
common sense were sufficient proof of a perception of corruption.  Id. at 738-39 nn.6-
7.  The trial court gave a detailed account of newspaper articles, emphasizing that 
Proposition A and Senate Bill 650 were enacted based on the public’s perception that 
the current system was corrupt, or at least that it appeared corrupt.  Id. at 737-39 
nn.6-7. 
50Shrink I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 740.  A contribution limit is different in kind from the limits 
in Buckley if the consequence of the restriction is more than “a marginal restriction 
upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
20.    
51The court reasoned that “despite Missouri’s contribution limits, candidates for state 
9
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adjusting for inflation to reflect their value in 1976 dollars.52  The court 
concluded that Senate Bill 650’s limits were narrowly tailored to meet the 
legitimate state goal of preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption.53 
 
C.  Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Adams (Shrink II)54 
 
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s analysis and 
reversed the ruling55 by rejecting Missouri’s argument that the limits are subject 
to intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny.56  Relying on its own rulings57 and 
language from Citizens Against Rent Control / Coalition for Fair Housing v. City 
of Berkeley, Cal.,58 the court concluded that a “rigorous standard of review” is 
strict scrutiny.59  The court focused on one issue after defining the appropriate 
                                                                                                                         
elected office are still quite able to raise funds sufficient to run effective campaigns.”  
Shrink I, 5 F.Supp 2d at 740-41.  The court also noted that the statute required an 
adjustment for inflation and that technological advances such as the fax machine, e-
mail and the Internet may also help offset the effects of inflation.  Id. at 742.  In 
addition, the court compared the percentage of contributors affected by the limits with 
the percentage affected in Buckley.  Id. at 741.  Senate Bill 650 limits would have 
affected only 1.5% to 2.38% of the contributions in a recent election, and this was 
below the 5.1% affected in Buckley.   Id. at 741.  Finally, the court concluded that the 
median income of a Missouri household was $31,046 and that the head of this 
household “would certainly consider ‘large’ a political contribution in excess of $1,075.” 
 Id. at 742.  This is important because Buckley stated that the only interest to justify 
limitations is the “real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on 
candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office.”  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
25 (emphasis added).  
52These figures reflect an adjustment using the Consumer Price Index.  Shrink I. 5 F. 
Supp. at 740 n.9. 
53Id. at 742.    
54161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government 
PAC, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999). 
55Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 523.  
56Id. at 521. 
57Id. at 521, citing Carver, 72 F.3d at 637, Russell, 146 F.3d at 567. 
58454 U.S. 290 (1981).  Quoting the “[r]egulation of First Amendment rights is always 
subject to exacting judicial review.”  Shrink  II, 161 F.3d at 521, quoting Citizens 
Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294. 
59The court stated that “the Supreme Court ‘articulated and applied a strict scrutiny 
standard of review’ to the federal contribution limits . . . and ‘has not ruled that 
anything other than strict scrutiny applies in cases involving contribution limits.’” 
Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 521, quoting Carver, 72 F.3d at 637, citing Citizens Against 
Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294. 
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standard of review: whether the state provided evidence of corruption or the 
perception of corruption.  Quoting,  
 
[w]hen the Government defends a regulation on speech . . . it 
must do more than simply posit the existence of the disease 
sought to be cured. . . . It must demonstrate that the recited 
harms are real, . . . and that the regulation will in fact alleviate 
these harms in a direct and material way [,]60 
 
the court discounted the State’s evidence as “conclusory and self-serving,”61 
holding that strict scrutiny requires objective proof of perceived corruption in 
Missouri’s political process.62  Not only had the state failed to show a 
compelling interest that would be served by the restrictions, the restrictions 
were not narrowly tailored.63  It reversed the lower court and held that the 
                                                 
60Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 522 n.3, quoting U.S. v. National Treasury Employees Union 
(NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (internal quotations omitted). This passage is the 
court’s primary support for its contention that the Government must submit proof of 
actual corruption or the perception of corruption.  See also Carver, 72 F.3d at 638. The 
court also relies on other Eighth Circuit rulings that demanded proof of actual harm.  
Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 521-22, citing Day, 34 F.3d at 1365; Russell, 146 F.3d at 568-
69; Carver, 72 F.3d at 638. 
61Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 522.  As proof of the appearance of corruption, the State 
submitted an affidavit of Senator Wayne Goode, who co-chaired the Interim Joint 
Committee on Campaign Finance Reform, when Senate Bill 650 was enacted.  Id. at 
522.  “The senator did not state that corruption then existed in the system, only that 
he and his colleagues believed there was the ‘real potential to buy votes’ if the limits 
were not enacted, and that contributions greater than the limits ‘have the appearance 
of buying votes.’”  Id. at 522, quoting affidavit of Senator Wayne Goode at p.9.  Contra, 
Shrink I, supra note 49. 
The court characterized the State’s position as assuming “that corruption and 
the perception thereof are inherent in political campaigns where large contributions are 
made, and that it is unnecessary for the State to demonstrate that these are actual 
problems in Missouri’s electoral system.”  Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 521.  The court cites 
NTEU, 513 U.S. 454 (1995), to support its demand for “some demonstrable evidence 
that there were genuine problems that resulted from contributions in amounts greater 
than the limits in place.”  Id. at 521, citing Russell, 146 F.3d at 568.  Professor La 
Pierre argues that although the Eighth Circuit’s requirement of proof of real harm is 
more rigorous than Buckley’s, it comports with more recent Supreme Court cases, 
such as NTEU.  D. Bruce La Pierre, Raising a New First Amendment Hurtle for 
Campaign Finance “Reform,” 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 217 (1998). 
62See Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 522. 
63Id.  After adjusting for inflation, the court stated that the “limits appear likely to ‘have 
a severe impact on political dialogue’ by preventing many candidates for public office 
‘from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.’”  Id. at 523, quoting 
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contribution limits violate a contributor’s First Amendment rights.64   
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Standard of Review  
 
The Supreme Court applies a “rigorous” standard of review65 to both 
contribution and independent expenditure limits in order “‘ to assure [the] 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.’”66  However, regardless of the actual label 
given to the test, the Court applies a heightened intermediate level of review67 
to contribution limits  and strict scrutiny 68 to independent expenditure limits.  
The most important issue that determines the appropriate level of scrutiny is 
                                                                                                                         
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.    Ironically, the court appeared to endorse Senate Bill 650’s 
limits in Carver v. Nixon.  Carver, 72 F.3d at 642-43.  The court compared Proposition 
A with Senate Bill 650 to highlight why Proposition A limits were not narrowly tailored. 
 Id.   
In considering whether Proposition A limits are narrowly tailored, we 
must also recognize that the limits were not adopted in a vacuum.  
The question is not simply that of some limits or none at all, but 
rather Proposition A as compared to those in Senate Bill 650 . . . .  
The Proposition A limits are only ten to twenty percent of the higher 
limits in Senate Bill 650. . . .  The record is barren of any evidence of 
a harm or disease that needed to be addressed between the limits of 
Senate Bill 650 and those enacted in Proposition A.    
Id. 
64Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 523. 
 
65For a review of various approaches to the issue of constitutionality, see supra notes 
37-39. 
66Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
67“Even a significant interference with protected rights of political association may be 
sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs 
means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”  
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Cousins v. 
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975). 
68Strict scrutiny requires a compelling interest and the governmental restriction must 
be necessary to address the compelling need. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral 
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 53 (1987).  The Court uses strict scrutiny when 
analyzing direct infringements on First Amendment rights for political advocacy.  See 
infra note 81. 
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whether the limitation directly infringes First Amendment rights.69   
 
1.  Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Association 70 
 
Both a contributor’s and a candidate’s free speech rights are affected 
by limits on campaign contributions.  Individuals who make a campaign 
contributions are expressing support for a candidate and the candidates’s 
views.  However, campaign contributions are merely a “general expression of 
support” for a candidate  and “[t]he expression rests solely on the 
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.”71  At most, the size of the 
contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor’s 
support for the candidate.”72  The Court believes that narrowly drawn 
contribution limits are not a direct infringement on political dialogue because 
contributors can engage in political dialogue of their own, and they have other 
ways to express support for a candidate.73   
                                                 
69This is because the Court applies strict scrutiny at the point at where a campaign 
restriction imposes a substantial restraint on freedom of speech and freedom of 
association.  See infra note 77. 
70Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.  Although not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, 
“freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an 
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”  National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).   The 
Constitution protects freedom of association “where the association’s goal or purpose  
is one that the first amendment independently protects such as political advocacy, 
litigation to advance social goals, or religious worship.”  Ann H. Jameson, Note, 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees: Discriminatory Membership Policy of a National 
Organization held not Protected by First Amendment Freedom of Association, 34 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1065-66 (1985). 
 
71Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.  Limitations on independent expenditures directly infringe 
upon political dialogue, while narrowly tailored contribution limits affect the content-
neutral aspect of speech, and are therefore a marginal interference with associational 
freedoms.  Id. at 19-39. 
72Id. at 21.  It is arguable, however, that for some contributors a higher contribution 
level expresses more support than a lower contribution level.  Id.  The Court stated 
that the contributor’s financial ability and past history of contributions are factors that 
may assess the intensity of the support, but it did not integrate these factors in its 
analysis of whether the Buckley limits were narrowly tailored.  Id. at 21 n.22.  The fact 
that the Court recognized these factors underscores the importance of ensuring that 
the restriction is narrowly drawn.  
73Id. at 28-29. “[C]ontribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any 
material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and 
13
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Contribution limits may also affect a candidate’s free speech rights. 
Pooling contributions may be the only way for candidates lacking personal 
wealth to engage in political dialogue.74  Narrowly drawn contribution limits do 
not dramatically affect campaign funding because a candidate can raise funds 
from a greater number of contributors, or encourage contributors to engage in 
direct political expression.75  However, limits on campaign contributions directly 
impair political dialogue if a candidate or political committee is unable to “amass 
 the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”76   
 
A contribution limit is unconstitutional at the point it directly interferes 
with political speech or association.  A contributor must be able to express 
support for a candidate, and the candidate must be able to engage in political 
advocacy.  A narrowly drawn contribution limit does not regulate political 
communication but only regulates the content-neutral speech 77 that lies 
beyond the political communication.78  However, because of the difficulty in 
determining the precise level of regulation that may or may not affect political 
speech,79 a heightened level of intermediate scrutiny is required.80  
                                                                                                                         
campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press, 
candidates, and political parties.”  Id. at 29.  This is because “persons [are] free to 
engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering 
their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in 
supporting candidates and committees with financial resources.”  Id. at 28.  See also 
supra note 30. 
74Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.   
75Id. at 22.   
76Id. at 21.  Supporting its argument that the FECA limits did not directly affect 
political dialogue, the Court notes that only 5.1% of the money raised for candidates in 
the 1974 Congressional race was obtained in amounts that exceeded the Act’s $1,000 
limitations.  Id. at 21 n.23.  In addition, “two major-party senatorial candidates . . . 
operated large-scale campaigns on contributions raised under a voluntarily imposed 
$100 contribution limitation.”  Id. at 21 n.23. 
 
77A narrowly drawn contribution limit is content-neutral because it does not affect the 
contributor’s expression of support for a candidate.  Symbolic speech inherent in 
campaign contributions is not proportional to the size of the contribution.  Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 19.  Consequently, because different levels of contributions do not 
necessarily involve different levels of speech, a narrowly drawn limitation only affects 
the content-neutral aspect of the speech. 
78See supra note 73. 
79See supra note 72. 
80See Stone, supra note 68.  There are at least seven standards of review for content-
neutral speech that represent three distinct standards: deferential, intermediate, and 
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2.  Buckley’s Plain Language 
 
Support for intermediate scrutiny is also found in the plain language of 
Buckley.  Under strict scrutiny, the Court demands “a compelling rather than 
substantial interest and that the challenged restriction is ‘necessary’ to achieve 
that interest.”81  In discussing contribution limits,  however, the Court 
characterizes the governmental goal of limiting corruption or the appearance of 
corruption as a “constitutionally sufficient justification”82 and a “weighty 
interest,”83 but not a compelling interest.84  The Court also deferred to 
Congressional judgment that a contribution limit is the appropriate method to 
combat corruption or the appearance of corruption85 and did not require proof 
                                                                                                                         
strict review.  Id. at 50.  In Buckley, the Court rejected the deferential standard which 
treats contribution limits as conduct, not political speech.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16, 
citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  Contra, supra note 27. 
81Stone, supra note 68 at 53, citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm’r 
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582-83 (1983); Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign 
Comm., (1982) 459 U.S. 87, 92; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 
596, 606-07 (1982); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39.  (1963) Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), further illustrates why 
expenditure limits are subject to strict scrutiny. 
Buckley “stands for the proposition that speaker-based laws demand 
strict scrutiny when they reflect the Government’s preference for the 
substance of what the favored speakers have to say (or aversion to 
what the disfavored speakers have to say). . . .  Because the 
expenditure limit in Buckley was designed to ensure that the political 
speech of the wealthy not drown out the speech of others, we found 
that it was concerned with the communicative impact of the regulated 
speech. . . .  Indeed, were the expenditure limitation unrelated to the 
content of expression, there would have been no perceived need for 
Congress to ‘equalize the relative ability’ of interested individuals to 
influence elections.”   
Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 658, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48 (emphasis 
added) (internal citations omitted). 
82Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. 
83Id. at 29. 
84In contrast, the Court characterized preventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption as a compelling interest in cases that challenged the constitutionality of 
expenditure limits.  NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97 (stating that these interests are “the 
only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified”); Colorado 
Republican, 518 U.S. at 609 (stating that the Court has weighed First Amendment 
interests against compelling governmental interests). 
85Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28.  The Court stated that “Congress was surely entitled to 
conclude that  . . . contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to 
15
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that the limits were necessary to meet this goal.86  Consequently, the Court 
applied a heightened level of intermediate scrutiny to the speech analysis as 
pertaining to contribution limits.87 
 
Limitations affect the contributor’s freedom of association 88 more so 
than freedom of speech.89  Freedom of association plays a very important role 
in political advocacy because pooling campaign contributions may be the only 
way for contributors to deliver a political message.90  However, contribution 
limits merely restrict, not prohibit, this aspect of associational freedom.91  As 
with freedom of speech, contributors are left with a variety of ways to exercise 
                                                                                                                         
deal with the reality or appearance of corruption,” and that bribery and disclosure laws 
are only partial solutions.  Id. at 28. 
86For the requirements of strict scrutiny, see supra note 68. 
87Stone, supra note 68.  Contribution “restrictions are constitutional if they serve 
‘sufficiently strong, subordinating’ interests by means of ‘narrowly drawn regulations 
designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First 
Amendment freedoms’.”  Id. at 49-50.  (Internal citations omitted).  In Turner 
Broadcasting, the Court noted that under intermediate scrutiny, a court should 
consider whether “‘constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means’ of achieving the 
Government’s asserted interests” do not exist in order to prevent suppressing more 
speech than necessary.  Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 668, quoting Sable 
Communications of Cal.., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989). 
88See supra note 24. 
89“[T]he primary First Amendment problem raised by the Act’s contribution limitations 
is their restriction of one aspect of the contributors’s freedom of political association.” 
 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25 (emphasis added).  The political expression inherent with 
campaign contributions is valued by our society, and restricting that expression 
impairs associational freedoms.  Id. at 15.  ‘“[E]ffective advocacy of both public and 
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group 
association.’”  Id., quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
 
90If a message that depends on associational freedoms is suppressed, the only 
message heard will be from the speaker with independent funds.   See Citizens 
Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 299. In Citizens Against Rent Control, a Berkeley, 
California ordinance placed a limitation of $250 on contributions to committees formed 
to support or oppose ballot measures, but it did not limit the amount of money an 
individual could spend for the same activity. Id. at 292.  The Court held that singling 
out and restricting those who pool their money was a restraint of their associational 
freedoms.  Id. at 300.  
91Contribution limits affect only one narrow aspect of associational freedoms: the 
ability of “like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common 
political goals.”  Buckley, 424 U.S at 22.   
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their associational freedoms.92  The Court held in Buckley that a restriction 
becomes unconstitutional when it is no longer “closely drawn to avoid 
unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.”93  This is not strict 
scrutiny.94   
 
3.  The Eighth Circuit’s Analysis 
 
The Eighth Circuit applies strict scrutiny to all campaign restrictions but 
it does not address whether a contribution restriction directly infringes First 
Amendment rights.95   To circumvent this question, it mischaracterizes 
Supreme Court analysis by stating that The Court expressed support for 
intermediate scrutiny in dicta only. 96  In reality, the Court repeatedly questions 
whether a particular restriction directly limits the expression of political views, 
and when it does the Court strikes down the restriction under a strict 
analysis.97  The converse is true when the restriction does not directly infringe 
                                                 
92See supra note 73.   
93Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.   
94Arguably, this may be strict scrutiny for associational freedoms, but it requires the 
same level of proof as intermediate scrutiny in the speech analysis.  The Buckley 
Court purported to apply strict scrutiny when it reviewed the Act’s disclosure 
requirement and its affect on associational freedoms.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64-66.  It 
stated that “[t]he strict test established by NAACP v. Alabama is necessary because 
compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.” Id. at 66.  However, immediately following that statement, the 
Court only required a “sufficiently important” governmental interest and a reasonable 
conclusion by Congress that full disclosure will “prevent the corrupt use of money to 
affect elections.”  Id. at 66-67.  If strict scrutiny was applied, the Government would be 
required to show that the restriction was necessary to serve a compelling interest. 
95Ironically, the Eighth Circuit recognizes that there is a constitutional distinction 
between restrictions on independent expenditures and contributions. Carver, 72 F.3d 
at 637.  However, it does not acknowledge the distinction between the levels of 
scrutiny.  Because the Supreme Court has not specifically held that intermediate 
scrutiny applies to contribution limits, the Eighth Circuit applies strict scrutiny to 
contribution limitations.  Id. at 637-38. 
 
96Carver, 72 F.3d at 637, citing FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 
238, 259-60 (1986); California Medical Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 196 (Marshall, J., plurality); 
Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 301 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). 
97California Medical Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 194-95 (stating that the contribution limits in 
Buckley “did not directly infringe on the ability of contributors to express their own 
political views”); Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 614-16 (1996) (stating that a 
fundamental constitutional difference exists between independent expenditures and 
contributions, and that contribution limitations only impose a marginal restriction on 
17
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speech.  For example, in California Medical Ass'n v. FEC,98 the appellants, 
California Medical Association (CMA), argued that the Federal Election 
Campaign Act’s99 $5000 multicandidate political committee contribution limit 
was the same as an unconstitutional expenditure limitation because it restricted 
their ability to engage in political speech through PAC expenditures.100  The 
Court rejected this proposition, stating that  
 
the ‘speech by proxy’ that CMA seeks to achieve through its 
contributions . . . is not the sort of political advocacy that this 
Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment 
protection . . . .  Our decision in Buckley precludes any 
argument to the contrary. . . .  [T]he First Amendment rights of 
a contributor are not infringed by limitations on the amount he 
may contribute to a campaign organization . . . .101 
 
B.  Deference to a Governmental Determination of Corruption or the 
Appearance of Corruption 
 
The Supreme Court has consistently relied on the prevention of 
                                                                                                                         
speech), citing NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497.  In Bellotti, the Court struck down a state 
statute that forbid certain independent expenditures by business corporations aimed at 
influencing ballot initiatives.  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767-68.  “Especially where, as here, 
a prohibition is directed at speech itself, and the speech is intimately related to the 
process of governing, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest 
which is compelling . . . .”  Id. at 786 (internal citations omitted). 
98453 U.S. 182 (1981). 
99The FECA provides in pertinent part that “‘no person shall make contributions . . . to 
any other political committee in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed 
$5,000.’”  Id. at 185 n.2, quoting 2 USC § 441a(a)(1)(C).  “A ‘multicandidate political 
committee’ is defined as a ‘political committee which has been registered under 
section 433 of this title for a period of not less that 6 months, which has received 
contributions from more than 50 persons, and . . . has made contributions to 5 or more 
candidates for Federal Office.’” Id. at 185 n.1, quoting 2 USC § 441a (a)(4). 
100Id. at 195. CMA filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality 
of the contribution limitation in response to a Federal Election Commission 
enforcement action.  Id. at 186. The FEC believed that CMA contributed more than 
$5,000 to a political committee that it formed, the California Medical Political Action 
Committee (CALPAC).  Id. 
 
101Id. at 196-97  In Buckley, the Court found that independent expenditures are entitled 
to full First Amendment protection because restrictions “impose direct and substantial 
restraints on the quantity of political speech.”  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39.  “[T]he 
governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is 
inadequate to justify [the Act’s] ceiling on independent expenditures.”  Id. at 45. 
18
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corruption or the appearance of corruption to determine if the government has 
sufficiently justified a limit on political contributions or independent 
expenditures.102  In FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee 
(NCPAC),103 Chief Justice Rehnquist defined corruption as “a subversion of 
the political process.  Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their 
obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions 
of money into their campaigns.  The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid 
pro quo: dollars for political favors.”104  In NCPAC, the Court legitimized the 
governmental interest of preventing both actual quid pro quo corruption, but 
also the prospect of elected officials being influenced by financial gain or 
infusions of money.105   
 
Even though states consistently rely on corruption or the appearance 
of corruption to argue the constitutionality of a particular reform measure,106 
inconsistencies arise when courts analyze whether the State has proven that it 
                                                 
102NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97; Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 296-97; 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-89. 
103470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
104Id. at 497.  This is a broader concern than given in Buckley, where the Court was 
concerned only with “the extent that large contributions are given to secure political 
quid pro quo . . . .”  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.   
105Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST. 
COMMENTARY  127 (1997).  Arguably, the Court expanded the concept of corruption 
again in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  Austin 
upheld restrictions on campaign expenditures by a corporation in order to protect 
election campaigns from the distorting effects of wealth.  Neuborne, supra note 30, at 
808.  Protecting the election campaign is a broader purpose than focusing on the 
improper influences large contributions may have on an elected official.  See id. 
106Commentators and courts hold tight to the notion that preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption is the only legitimate governmental interest to justify 
restrictions on campaign contributions.  See, e.g., supra note 4.  However, in NCPAC, 
the Court held that these are the “only legitimate and compelling governmental 
interests thus far identified . . . .”  NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97 (emphasis added).  In 
Buckley, the Court did not invalidate the interest of equalizing “the relative ability of all 
citizens to affect the outcome of elections” as it pertains to contribution limits.  
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.  It merely avoided the issue by holding that the corruption 
rationale was a sufficient justification to impose contribution limits.  Id.   
When discussing independent expenditure limits, however, the Court stated 
that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our 
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.”  Id. at 48-49.  This distinction is explained by the fact that independent 
expenditure limits are a direct restraint on political expression and contribution limits 
are not.  See supra note 81. 
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has been harmed by large contributors.  Some courts, including the Eighth 
Circuit,  require the State to provide objective proof of harm.107  Other courts 
defer to the government’s determination that the harm exists.108 
                                                 
107In the Eighth Circuit, if the state claims that limitations are necessary to remedy 
perceived corruption, it must prove that the perception is reasonable and derived from 
the magnitude of the contributions.  See Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 519 (syllabus).  In 
Russell, the court held that if the state claims a limit is necessary to prevent actual 
corruption, it must provide demonstrable evidence that a state representative’s position 
on a bill changed due to an intervening contribution, or evidence of voting in a relevant 
fashion in response to a contribution.  Russell, 146 F.3d at 569-70.  The court stated 
that concealing the source of a contribution is also reasonable proof of corruption.  Id. 
at 570.  See also National Black Police Ass’n, 924 F.Supp at 281-81. 
The Eighth Circuit’s analysis is similar to the district court’s in Democratic 
Party of the United States v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, where 
it rejected evidence of the appearance of corruption.   Democratic Party of the United 
States v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC I), 578 F. Supp. 
797, 824-830 (E.D. Pa. 1983) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480 
(1985).  In NCPAC I, the district court held that “evidence of high-level appointments in 
the Reagan administration of persons connected with the PACs, [] newspaper articles 
and polls purportedly showing a public perception of corruption . . . [and] [a] tendency 
to demonstrate distrust of PACs” was not sufficient evidence of corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.  NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 499.  “[A]n exchange of political favors 
for uncoordinated expenditures remains a hypothetical possibility and nothing more.”  
Id. at 498.  Although NCPAC I rejected proof that is similar to the proof accepted in 
Shrink I, an important distinction between the cases is the manner in which the 
restrictions infringe First Amendment rights.  NCPAC imposed limitations on a 
presidential candidate’s independent expenditures when accepting public financing for 
their general election campaign.  Id. at 482, citing 26 USC § 9012(f).  However, these 
limitations result in a direct infringement on speech and the Court employed strict 
scrutiny.  Id. at 496-97.  In contrast, Shrink III addresses contribution limits, in which 
narrowly drawn limits demand intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny.  See supra 
note 87. 
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit, the Middle District of Florida held in Florida 
Right to Life that although the evidence did not specifically involve large contributions 
in exchange for political favors, evidence pointing to a willingness to exchange favors 
for money is a legitimate basis of concern over large contributions.  Florida Right to 
Life, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16694, at *21 n.12.  Some courts do not engage in the 
analysis at all.  See Kentucky Right to Life, 108 F.3d 637 (1997). 
108Some courts first analyze whether a particular contribution limitation is different in 
kind from Buckley limitations.  See, e.g., Kentucky Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 648.  
The Sixth Circuit makes an absolute comparison but does not explain why a $1,000 
per election year limit in 1997 is not different in kind from Buckley’s $1,000 per 
election limit in 1976.  Id.  See also Florida Right to Life, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16694, at *25 (making an absolute dollar comparison with Buckley).  
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If the government relies solely on preventing corruption to justify 
contribution limitations it should provide objective proof of corruption.  Even 
under an intermediate level of scrutiny, “[w]hen the Government defends a 
regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated 
harms, it must do more than simply ‘posit the existence of the disease sought to 
be cured.’”109   Speculation about harm is not a sufficient justification to 
restrain First Amendment rights.110  If government claims that large campaign 
contributions result in corruption, the government should provide proof of 
corruption.  Deference to a legislative finding of corruption is unnecessary 
because quid pro quo corruption 111 is essentially bribery,112 and this can be 
proven in a court of law.  A more difficult problem involves what proof will satisfy 
a showing of the appearance113 of corruption as the result of a large 
contribution. 
                                                 
109Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 664, quoting Quincy Cable TV Inc. v. FCC, 768 
F.2d 1434, 1455 (CADC 1985).  See also Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 618; 
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475; Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 522 n.3. 
110Even “a ‘reasonable’ burden on expression requires a justification far stronger than 
mere speculation about serious harms.”  NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475, quoting Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (“Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify 
suppression of free speech and assembly.  Men feared witches and burnt women  
. . . .  To justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground to fear 
that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced.”).  In discussing contribution 
limits, the Buckley Court noted that there were “deeply disturbing examples” of 
corruption in the 1972 election, proving that the governmental justification of preventing 
corruption was not based on mere speculation of corruption.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. 
111Quid pro quo corruption occurs when elected officials are “influenced to act contrary 
to their obligations of office.”  NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497.   
112Bribery is defined as “the giving, offering, or taking of bribes.”  WEBSTER’S NEW 
WORLD DICTIONARY 66 (2d college ed. 1974).  Bribes are “anything given or promised 
to induce a person to do something against his wishes.”  Id.  It is reasonable to 
assume that elected officials wish to meet their obligations of office, but there are 
many interpretations of what is an obligation of office. 
Professor Strauss argues that bribery of elected officials is not the most 
important concern with campaign contributions because elected officials do not enrich 
themselves by the receipt of contributions.  David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and 
Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (1994).  The candidate 
uses contributions to obtain votes through a campaign, but this is no different than the 
ordinary practice of taking a position on an issue to obtain votes.  Id. at 1373.  One 
could argue, however, that personal enrichment is not narrowly limited to immediate 
monetary gain.  Undoubtedly, elected officials are enriched by notoriety, power and 
career opportunities as a direct result of winning a campaign and serving in office. 
113Appearance is defined as “the look or outward aspect of a person or thing . . . , the 
way things seem to be.”  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 66 (2d college ed. 1974). 
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Perceived corruption could require actual corruption, arguing that 
without actual corruption, the appearance of corruption is unreasonable.114  
This argument fails because the Buckley  Court addressed the appearance of 
corruption as a separate matter and only required “public awareness of the 
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial 
contributions.”115  Therefore, the Government should prove that the public is 
aware of the opportunity for abuse by elected officials and that the abuse 
comes from large contributions.  Unfortunately, this is not as simple as charging 
an elected official with accepting bribes and relying on a jury to render a 
verdict.116  The focus is on the broader belief of the electorate, not on the 
conduct of one or several elected officials.  As a result, courts should give 
deference to a reasonable legislative determination regarding the appearance 
of corruption as perceived by the electorate.117 
 
In Shrink I, the district court found that the electorate perceived 
corruption of elected officials as the result of large contributions.118  In Shrink 
                                                 
114The Eighth Circuit would probably reject empirical evidence of perceived corruption 
by the electorate if not accompanied by proof of actual corruption.  See supra note 61. 
115Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).  Concern about the public’s awareness 
of “improper influence ‘is [] critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative 
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’”  Id., quoting United States 
Civil Service Comm’n v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973). 
116Which would be the case for quid pro quo corruption.  See supra notes 111-12. 
117This position is supported by the Court in Turner Broadcasting, where it noted that 
“[s]ound policymaking often requires legislators to forecast future events and to 
anticipate the likely impact of these events based on deductions and inferences for 
which complete empirical support may be unavailable.”  Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. 
at 665.  For intermediate scrutiny, the government only has to show “reasonable 
inferences based on substantial evidence.”  Id. at 666.   
118First, the district court cited an affidavit by Senator Wayne Goode who co-chaired 
the Interim Joint Committee on Campaign Finance Reform.  
In that affidavit, the Senator stated that the Committee ‘heard 
testimony on and discussed the significant issue of balancing the 
need for campaign contributions versus the potential for buying 
influence.’  He further testified to his belief that contributions in 
excess of the limits set by Missouri [in Senate Bill 650] ‘have the 
appearance of buying votes as well as the real potential to buy 
votes.’ 
Shrink I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 738.  The district court cited numerous newspaper stories 
and editorials leading up to the adoption of Senate Bill 650 and Proposition A, 
concluding that the public’s perception of corruption comported with the Senator’s 
affidavit.  Id. at 738-39 nn.6-7.  The court also noted that seventy-four percent of voters 
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II, the Eighth Circuit focused on proof of actual corruption and granted no 
deference to the legislature’s determination of perceived corruption.119  
However, intermediate scrutiny requires that “courts must accord substantial 
deference to the predictive judgments” of the government.120   This includes a 
reasonable legislative determination that there is an appearance of corruption 
as the result of large contributions.  Once the government reasonably 
ascertains that it is necessary to remedy the appearance of corruption, the 
court should question whether the limits are narrowly drawn.121 
 
C.  Narrowly Drawn Contribution Limits 
 
When a court finds that the government has stated a legitimate interest 
or put forth sufficient proof of harm, it employs one of several tests to 
determine if a contribution limit is unconstitutionally low.  Some courts make 
absolute dollar comparisons with Buckley, claiming that a $1,000 contribution 
limit is not “different in kind” from Buckley’s $1,000 limit.122  Other courts make 
inflationary adjustments to the challenged limits and then compare them with 
Buckley.123  Courts may also evaluate the percentage of contributors affected 
                                                                                                                         
supported Proposition A, further proof that the public shared the Senator’s views. Id. at 
739 n7. 
119The Eighth Circuit simply focused on Senator Goode’s affidavit and dismissed the 
evidence of perceived corruption.  Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 522.  The “senator pointed to 
no evidence that ‘large’ campaign contributions were being made  in the days before 
limits were in place, much less that they resulted in real corruption or the perception 
thereof.”  Id., citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.  “The senator did not state that corruption 
then existed in the system, only that he and his colleagues believed there was the 
‘real potential to buy votes’ if the limits were not enacted, and that contributions 
greater than the limits ‘have the appearance of buying votes.’”  Id.   
In contrast, the district court noted that “members of the legislature are 
uniquely qualified to gauge whether allowing those contributions to go unchecked 
endangers our democratic system of government, and, if so, to prescribe an 
appropriate remedy therefor.”  Shrink I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 738.  
120Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 665. 
121Buckley “stressed that the judiciary should not take out a scalpel to probe dollar 
limitations because ‘distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be 
said to amount to differences in kind.’”  Kentucky Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 64 quoting 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (upholding $1,000 contribution limit because it was not 
different in kind from Buckley). 
122See Kentucky Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 648; Florida Right to Life, 1998 U.S. Dist 
LEXIS 16694, at *25.  
 
123The Eighth Circuit employs this standard.  See text accompanying supra notes 46-
53.  In dissent, Judge Gibson strongly disagrees with this analysis.  Shrink II, 161 
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by the limits,124 and whether the contribution limits prevent a candidate from 
mounting an effective campaign.125   
 
When determining if a contribution limit unconstitutionally infringes a 
contributor or candidate’s First Amendment rights126 the Court considers 
whether the restriction directly impairs an essential function of the First 
Amendment, which is to enable all members of society to participate in 
democratic decision-making.127  The point at which a contribution limit directly 
                                                                                                                         
F.3d at 525 (Gibson, J., dissent).   
[E]ven if it were proper to adjust Buckley for inflation, [this analysis] 
lacks a principled yardstick to assess the constitutionality of any 
contribution limit.  Its measure  of what ‘differs in kind’ and what 
‘differs in degree’ from the Buckley limits is standardless and lacks 
any explanation to support its bald conclusion that the limits at issue 
are ‘overtly restrictive as a matter of law.’ 
Id. 
124In National Black Police Ass’n, the court held that the contribution limits were 
unconstitutional because 17% to 84% of individual contributions were higher than the 
imposed limits, and as a result, candidates had to resort to less effective methods of 
disseminating their message.  National Black Police Ass’n., 924 F. Supp. at 275-81.  
125“[C]ontribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the 
limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the 
resources necessary for effective advocacy.”  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.  See also 
California Prolife, 989 F.Supp. at 1297 (holding that $500 per election makes it 
impossible for an ordinary candidate to mount an effective campaign); Fireman v. 
United States, 20 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D. Mass. 1998).  Citing Buckley, the Fireman 
court stated that it must consider how the contribution limitation affects the financing 
of political campaigns, and “such assessment should occur in a evidentiary context of 
actual figures on costs, contributions, and expenditures in order fully to assess the 
impact” of the contribution limit.  Fireman, 20 F.Supp. 2d at 236, citing Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 21-22.   
126See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
127Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 
877, 882-84 (1963).  Professor Emerson identifies reasons why the First Amendment 
freedoms of speech and association serve political decision-making.  Id.   First, 
“[f]reedom of expression in the political realm is usually a necessary condition for 
securing freedom elsewhere.”  Id. at 883.  Next, speech enables the government to 
ascertain “the needs and wishes of its citizens” and to be responsive to its people.  Id. 
 Finally, the Declaration of Independence states that the government derives its power 
from the consent of its citizens, and “the governed must, in order to exercise their right 
of consent, have full freedom of expression both in forming individual judgments and in 
forming the common judgment.”  Id.  See also Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech 
Justifications , 89 COLUM L. REV. 119 (1989). 
This function of the First Amendment raises additional questions regarding the 
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infringes upon the First Amendment rights of candidates and contributors is the 
point at which a court should reject the limit as unconstitutional.128  The court 
should evaluate if the candidate can engage in effective political advocacy in 
the candidate’s district despite the contribution limits.129  This measure will also 
help determine if the contributors’ right to associate with a candidate is 
infringed.  If candidates cannot deliver political speech a supporting contributor 
may be inable to associate with their candidate of choice.130  A court should 
also examine the percentage of contributors affected by the limitation to 
determine if the government favors individual speech over speech that relies 
on the pooling of money.131  Because different voting districts demand different 
levels of funds to engage in effective political advocacy, a limitation can be 
tailored to the type or character of the campaign without preventing the 
purpose of association or speech.132 The Eighth Circuit’s inflation analysis133 
is not a meaningful measure.  Buckley did not establish $1,000 as a 
constitutional floor for a contribution limit.  The Court merely held that the 
limitation would not affect First Amendment rights to any significant degree.134  
An inflationary analysis makes no distinction between the cost of a Federal 
campaign with that of a campaign for city council in a municipality of less than 
100,000 people.  This analysis is an easy way for a court to strike down a 
campaign limitation without placing it in context for the community the limitation 
                                                                                                                         
role of the government to meet these goals.  Some commentators argue that the First 
Amendment is a grant of governmental power to ensure that the voices of the 
electorate are equalized and not drowned out by the voices of the wealthy.  See, e.g., 
Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (Feb. 1987);  Others view the 
First Amendment as a restraint on governmental power for the purpose of allowing 
unfettered speech.  See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 6. 
128See supra note 125.  Intermediate scrutiny requires that the restriction not 
unnecessarily infringe First Amendment rights while strict scrutiny requires that the 
restriction is necessary.  See supra notes 60, 75.  However, commentators argue that 
almost all forms of campaign finance reform are ineffective.  See supra note 4.  
Therefore, like strict scrutiny, if the contribution limit is a direct infringement but there 
is no impact on the appearance of corruption, it unnecessarily infringes on the 
contributor or candidates’s rights. 
129Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.  See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text 
130Affiliating with a candidate is one aspect of freedom of association.  Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 22.  See also infra note 70. 
131This analysis is similar to that employed in Citizens Against Rent Control.  See 
supra note 90. 
132This was reflected in the contribution scheme set forth by Missouri that the Eighth 
Circuit invalidated in Carver and Shrink II.  See supra note 40-41. 
133See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
134Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 525 (Gibson, J., dissenting).  See also supra note 123. 
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purports to serve. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Eighth Circuit’s analysis is faulty in several respects.  First, the 
Buckley Court did not employ strict scrutiny to analyze the constitutionality of 
restrictions on campaign contributions.  It employed the lesser standard of 
heightened intermediate scrutiny.135  Second, the Eighth Circuit requires 
objective proof of harm while ignoring the circumstances under which 
contribution limits were effectuated in Missouri.136  Senate Bill 650 and 
Proposition A were enacted in consideration of the influence of large 
contributions on the democratic process.137  The facts established in the 
district court138 are sufficient proof of the appearance of corruption under 
intermediate scrutiny.139  Finally, merely adjusting for inflation is not the proper 
test to determine if a contribution limit is narrowly tailored to serve both speech 
and associational rights.140  The proper test determines the effect of the limits 
on both the percentage of total contributions received, and the number of 
contributors affected.141   Under this analysis, the Supreme Court should 




                                                 
135See supra notes 65-101 and accompanying text. 
136See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. 
137Id. 
138See supra note 118. 
139See supra notes 87.  Curiously, although the Eighth Circuit  demanded objective 
proof of harm regarding the appearance of corruption, the court relied on pure 
speculation when stating, in dicta, that the contribution limits were not narrowly 
tailored.  Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 523.  “In today’s dollars, the SB650 limits appear likely 
to ‘have a severe impact on political dialogue’ by preventing many candidates for public 
office ‘from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy,”  Id., quoting 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added). 
140See supra note 123. 
141See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text. 
142See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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